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                 `It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of 
capitalism.'  
                                                                                        Fredric Jameson 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: A consumer society that has embraced global capitalism while striving to preserve 
all the comforts and conveniences provided by technoscience is arguably fatally ill. Much 
support for this gloomy diagnosis is provided by, among others, Hannah Arendt, Northrop 
Frye, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Their reflections on the health of a human culture point up the 
urgency of the need to rethink the idea of good reasoning that predominates in the West. 
However, they also indicate that a healthier, more life-enhancing conception of good 
reasoning will arise only when a concern for justice and wisdom displaces the traditional ideals 
of pure and certain knowledge or eternal truths. To this end, Nietzsche recommends that 
philosophy ought now to concentrate on producing `cultural physicians' who would strive to 
fashion a philosophy of concern. This type of philosophical therapist requires a radically 
nonmodern approach to philosophy that must pivot on a vitalistic metaphysics capable of 
overcoming pervasive nihilistic ideologies which illustrate a globally spreading mythology of 
unconcern. Hence an effective and lasting cultural therapy will depend on the emergence of a 
general will/desire to broaden the conception of good reasoning beyond the narrow 
perspectives established by modern science. And this will depend in turn on the education of 
future educators who stress above all the importance of cultivating the mythopoeic 
imaginations of the young. 
 KEYWORDS: Arendt, Frye, Nietzsche, cultural health, education, emergence, imagination, 
justice, metaphysics,  metaphor, myth, reason. 
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1. ON THE NEED TO STOP AND THINK ABOUT LIFE AND THOUGHT 
A prerequisite for good thinking, says Hannah Arendt, is a complete letting go of 
one's fondest hopes and deepest beliefs; that is, those underpinnings of daily thought 
that determine what we take to be `normal.' She herewith elicits the image of a 
responsible citizen as one who is always willing and ready to take literally the common 
locution: `stop and think'; that is, prepared to withdraw from life's mundane 
preoccupations in order to look more closely at the ramifications of some unexpected 
turn of events. That this should now be seen as an urgent need is indicated by the 
constant stream of reports referring to the hitherto unimaginable consequences of 
`climate change.' This looming eventuality promises to alter forever, if not end, what 
we take to be civilized life on this planet.  
More specifically, it appears that this phrase ought to signal a critical moment in 
the history of the supposedly enlightened civilization of the West---which should 
perhaps have long since begun to wonder whether it had acquired a good 
understanding of the ideals and idea of reason. Such a doubt ought now, at any rate, 
to stand at the forefront of this society's concerns, although a widespread attitude of 
indifference to the implications of `climate change' appears to testify to the opposite. 
This situation suggests that the celebrated civilization of the West has already become 
so mired in a virulent bad sense that it is unable to muster either the will or desire to 
rethink some of its fondest assumptions.  
One of the most pernicious of these seems to be concealed within the popular 
mantra of `progress.' In terms of the problems I am referring to, this word may signify 
a collective mentality that harbours a self-destructive neurosis, if not a fatal psychosis, 
since it seems to go hand in hand with a fear or hatred of the freedom inherent in 
thought. For not only does the idea of progress serve to distract thinkers from 
questioning the dominant conception of good reasoning, it may also prevent our 
intellectual and political leaders from taking seriously Friedrich Nietzsche's trenchant 
criticisms of his contemporaries, who he accused of dishonesty and self-deception. 
One of his justifications for this charge is that they promote the delusory belief that 
simple answers can be found to complex problems. This tendency encourages a blind 
faith in system and hence a systemic narrowing of perspectives, with the result that the 
moderns have instituted educational systems that teach a kind of stupidity.1
Nietzsche's  reflections on the dubious conception of good thinking endorsed by 
his contemporaries thus led him to the view that the problem of culture is one of the 
more urgent, complex, and difficult problems of his `hard times.'  That he was very 
   
                                                     
1 I discuss this thought in a larger context in my Process, Reality, and the Power of  Symbols: Thinking with  A. N. 
Whitehead (Basingstoke, Eng.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), esp. Chapter 8.  
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close to identifying the chief problem of our own hard times has been borne out by 
the steady rise of a ruthless, imperialistic form of global capitalism that reflects a deep-
seated contempt for both life and thought. That is, it operates under the aegis of the 
assumption that the West has achieved such a high degree of civilization that it has 
acquired the right to exploit `lesser' ones. So all that appears to have changed since 
Nietzsche's hard times is that the moderns have since succeeded in subjecting the 
entire globe to a form of economic imperialism.   
Hence one of the more pressing questions that Nietzsche prompts with his critique 
of a culture that has flourished through embracing narrow perspectives is whether its 
successes are owing to a perhaps invincible alliance between stupidity and cupidity. 
His gloomy diagnosis of a falsely rational civilization bent on covering the globe with 
a duplicitous bad sense prompts one to wonder anyway whether this dreadful duo 
signifies the final stages of a mortal disease. But without doubt the question of the 
nature of the sicknesses cultures are prone to succumb to is extremely complex. It is 
conceivable that the now popular mantra of globalization is not so much a symptom 
of a civilization mindlessly bent on self-destruction as a sign that it was bound, for one 
reason or another, to share the fate of all civilizations.  
Or perhaps the very popularity of this mantra merely reflects the defining trait of 
earlier Eurocentric imperialisms which pursued a  ruthless and relentlessly ambitious 
takeover of the wealth, resources and even the daily lives of the members of weaker 
cultures. These voracious empires may have merely morphed into the more faceless 
international corporations which serve the hegemonic ambitions of an economic 
imperialism. Everywhere huge international businesses gobble up smaller and weaker 
businesses in a relentless pursuit of monopolistic powers, thereby confirming that the 
watchword `globalization' goes hand in hand with the deceptively positive mantras of 
`growth' and `progress.'  
This situation bespeaks a sort of smug callousness that is curiously blind to the fact 
that unlimited growth is the chief characteristic of the most life-threatening cancers. 
On this count alone one might identify one of the principal and most pernicious 
features of global capitalism as unconcern. A certain mindlessness is also evidenced by 
an obsessive desire to accumulate ever more secular power and wealth. I say `secular' 
because the moderns have even hi-jacked the notion of power whose full meaning, 
along with that of many other important ideas, has been reduced to a shadow of itself. 
For this little word arguably holds the key to the very quicknesses manifested by both 
Life and Thought.   
That is to say, our dire situation warrants speaking of a fatal disease inasmuch as 
the culture is now unable to make a sustained effort to promote and protect such 
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powers. For without their vigorous application, it cannot hope to become or remain 
either healthy or truly civilized. Such powers are usually only noticed, ironically 
enough, by those moderns who acknowledge that spontaneous acts of creative 
thinking often lead scientists on occasion to introduce important novelties into 
scientific theories. Indeed, these moments of inspiration invest the notion of 
technoscientific `progress' with a modicum of truth. But there is a deep chasm lying 
between the sort of `progress' made by advances in technical understanding and that 
which is promised by the far more profound and general notion of enlightened 
understanding. Yet it is just this consideration that tends to be dismissed as irrelevant 
to the quest to understand good thinking.  
Nearly a half century ago Northrop Frye, in a series of lectures published under 
the title The Modern Century, presciently outlined some of the long-term consequences 
for the health of this culture of the failure to recognize the need to frequently stop and 
think. It instead chose to invest all its faith in the promises conveyed by the mantra of 
`progress.' This sort of faith, in other words, is a sure sign of a burgeoning bad sense 
that will eventually destroy democracy from within:    
All the social nightmares of our day seem to focus on some unending and 
inescapable form of mob rule. The most permanent kind of mob rule is not 
anarchy, nor is it the dictatorship that regularizes anarchy, nor even the 
imposed police state depicted by Orwell. It is rather the self-policing state, the 
society incapable of formulating an articulate criticism of itself and of developing 
a will to act in its light. This is a condition we are closer to, on this continent, 
than we are to dictatorship. In such a society the conception of progress would 
reappear as a donkey's carrot, as the new freedom we shall have as soon as some 
regrettable temporary necessity is out of the way. No one would notice that the 
necessities never come to an end, because the communications media would 
have destroyed the memory.2
Indeed, the communications media have since provided ample evidence of the 
efficiency with which the avalanche of ingenious communication devices can 
postpone indefinitely the hard work of thinking. Thus Frye's warnings resonate 
strongly with critiques of modernity which focus on the tendency of a consumer 
society to starve the will/desire to think, an activity that Arendt suggests is a vital 
human need. But if this is so, it is a need that is easily side-lined. Consider the 
common tendency to defer to accredited `experts,' such as Nobel prize-winning 
economists who preach the virtues of unlimited growth in a world of shrinking 
resources and growing populations. This example of a blind faith in the good sense of 
   
                                                     
2 Northrop Frye, The Modern Century (Toronto, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 45. 
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whoever happens to rise to the top of what seems to have already become a 
complacent self-policing state attests to a culture thoroughly infested with dead or 
moribund souls. For they typically pay lip service to the noblest of human ideals while 
continually acting in accordance with the basest of human motives.  
Thus the false freedom that Frye refers to ensures a continual sacrifice of the 
powers manifested by Life and Thought to false gods, such as `efficiency,' 
`productivity,' `growth,' and `prosperity.' These false gods, however, would soon 
become impotent were it not for the steady supply of ingenious gadgets that feed an 
insatiable appetite for ever more comforts and conveniences. So it behooves one to 
ask whether the high-priests of technoscience ought to bear a good deal of the 
responsibility for our present plight. This quasi-religious institution, after all, both 
underwrites and promotes the hubristic belief that the human animal even has  the 
right to design new forms of life while seeking to gain systematic control over the 
complex processes manifested by the quicknesses of  life and thought. No doubt 
technoscience should be given a good deal of credit for inventing various means to 
ensure longer lives and healthier bodies, for there is no denying the efficacy of, for 
instance, modern surgical procedures. But the ever-expanding damage being done to 
the planet's rich variety of ecological systems ought to remind everyone that 
technoscience at this crucial moment in history can hardly be granted immunity from 
critical attention. 
Indeed, it seems that a general reluctance to question the epistemic authority of 
the scientistic priesthood has a good deal to do with all the confusion surrounding the 
question of how to think and act in the face of the threat of `climate change.' This 
confusion not only bears out Nietzsche's very low opinion of established systems of 
education which do not address critically enough the question of the proper place of 
science in society. Yet the crisis threatened by `climate change' is as much a challenge 
to the ways we have been taught to think as the ways in which we have learned to live. 
And the former may owe a good deal to scientistic propagandists who often promote 
misinformation, half-truths, and clever lies in a manner not unlike capitalism's 
specialists in advertising and public relations.  
In any case, our dire situation may owe a good deal to an entrained propensity to 
fear the freedom inherent in thought. It is therefore not incidental that one of 
Nietzsche's chief concerns involves the problem of how to encourage the birth and 
education of `free spirits.' That they may provide the main hope for a cure for a sick 
collective mentality that is very receptive to self-policing is borne out by  Arendt in her 
study of the conscience of one of the Nazi's most efficient and loyal servants, Adolf 
Eichmann. She was particularly struck by his inability to comprehend the nature of 
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his participation in a monstrous crime. He evidenced neither anti-Semitic prejudices, 
nor a deep-seated malevolence, much less an ignorance of ethical obligations. He was 
rather a typical product of a system of education which had sadly failed in its primary 
responsibility---to cultivate the imaginations of the young. For Eichmann was not 
alone in being unable to imagine the horrific consequences of maintaining an 
unquestioning loyalty to the degenerate powers he so diligently served. Hence Arendt 
was led in the end to coin the phrase `banality of evil' as a more accurate descriptor of 
Nazi atrocities than `radical evil.'  
Briefly, then, if Eichmann, as Arendt suggests, was the product of a culture which 
actively discouraged a natural inclination to stop and think, his example may go a 
long way towards accounting for the alleged `normality' of the rapacious managers 
and servants of globally ambitious international corporations. Their manifest lack of 
concern for anything except short-term gains bespeaks severely stunted imaginations. 
On the other hand,  it is possible that the evils of global capitalism may merely reflect 
the sad fact that the human animal is prone to lapse into an unreflective complacency 
the more comfortable he becomes, as seems implicit in  Arendt's summing up of the 
lesson she drew from the ascendancy of 20st century totalitarianism:  
[t]he mass man whom Himmler organized for the greatest mass crimes ever 
committed in history bore the features of the philistine rather than of the mob 
man, and was the bourgeois who in the midst of the ruins of his world worried 
about nothing so much as his private security, was ready to sacrifice everything--
-belief, honor, dignity---on the slightest provocation. Nothing proved easier to 
destroy than the privacy and private morality of people who thought of nothing 
but safeguarding their private lives.3
She might have added that a culture infused with an insatiable desire for material 
possessions is also one haunted by a fear of losing them. Such a fear appears amply 
illustrated by the haste with which  formerly cherished high ideals can be jettisoned.
  
4
In any case, it is surely far too simplistic to attribute the evils of global capitalism 
  
The `mass man's' desire to protect above all else his security, comforts, and 
conveniences perhaps even explains the curious lack of response to the threat of 
climate change. Any proposed remedy that cannot guarantee the continuation of 
comfortable material conveniences--which the `mass man' now tends to regard as 
entitlements---may simply be unthinkable.  
                                                     
3  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1996), p. 338. 
4 Consider the fate in the USA of the rule of law, which many hold to be the cornerstone of civilization. 
The current president, who (one would have thought) should be the first to leap to the defence of the 
Constitution, has recently endorsed the radical undermining of the rule of law that was begun by his 
predecessor who blithely appealed to `national security' to justify his act of vandalism.  
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to the selfishness and greed of an elite few.  It is therefore worth noting that, as Arendt 
maintains, every totalitarian state is completely dependent on the complicity of the 
`mass man.' It is moreover not insignificant that Frye chooses the image of a carrot to 
elicit the idea of a self-policing mentality that has eagerly welcomed communication 
devices which not only contribute to the ease and reach of personal contacts. Such 
devices have already proven their worth as efficient means of thought-control. It 
seems our political leaders desire nothing so much as control over all means of 
communication. Thus a very modern (i.e., globalized) form of totalitarianism appears 
to be taking root, one that is highly skilled in the silent manipulation of all the lures 
that encourage  self-policing.5
 It may therefore be much easier to imagine the end of the world than the demise 
of global capitalism. The latter is of course conceivable in at least the sense that 
parasites tend in the long run to undermine the health of, if not actually kill, their 
indispensable hosts. There is in any event no lack of evidence that there are subtle 
forces and covert pressures which steadily undermine the collective will to think freely 
and critically. One need consider only the widespread acceptance of that infamous 
and obviously false declaration that there is no such thing as a society. If the term 
`society' is understood to refer to an integrated community of mutually caring or 
concerned souls, there may soon be no society left anywhere on earth.  
   
2. ON THE HEGEMONY OF A MYOPIC UNCONCERNED REASON  
The champions of a culture of unconcern, in short, bear witness to an entrenched 
collective mentality that has willingly embraced nihilistic doctrines and destructive 
practices. This point returns us to Nietzche's persistent concern about what role 
philosophy should play in the `enculturation' of a healthy culture. For his charge of a 
systematic betrayal of thought (and hence of life) by alleged specialists in good 
thinking  indicates not only that modern philosophy has not given nearly enough 
thought to the `large' question of what it means to be able to think.  It has perhaps 
also helped to undermine a potentially vital collective will with a plurality of effete, 
self-policing wills. So inasmuch as a healthy culture depends for its continuing vitality 
on being able to educate `free spirits,' it may be essential to try to estimate the 
importance of this vague but highly evocative notion. Indeed, both Nietzsche and 
Arendt appear to be saying that such spirits cannot possibly thrive if systems of 
                                                     
5 See Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) wherein he defines `inverted totalitarianism' as a new form 
of fascistic political organization whereby unelected, anti-democratic corporate managers seek total 
control over important cultural institutions (in the domains of the media, finance, education, etc.).  
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education do not make concerted efforts to cultivate the powers of imagination in the 
young. For what could a `free spirit' signify if not a free will that is always ready to 
activate a free imagination?  
The many faceted problem of culture that Nietzsche sketches thus brings us face 
to face not only with the question of how to engender a better system of education but 
also with the question whether it is even possible to fashion a philosophical therapy 
that might help alleviate our present situation. In calling for philosophy to attempt to 
educate `cultural physicians' who would work `for the benefit of a time to come,' 
Nietzsche expresses however a certain optimism. But at the same time he is broaching 
the possibility that  modern philosophy is not in a fit state to produce the sort of 
physician he has in mind.  
So a short digression may be in order. Let us consider the conception of good 
thinking promoted in the Anglophone world where apprentice philosophers are 
taught that logical rigour in argumentation holds the key to good reasoning. The 
situation has been described by John Cottingham thus:   
Philosophy is among the fastest-growing A-level subjects in Britain. This suggests 
that despite the pressure from governments to increase the teaching of technical, 
career oriented subjects, a lot of sixth-formers have a stubborn interest in more 
traditional enquiries about the meaning of life. Also near the top of the list of 
fast-growing subjects is Religious Studies; and this again seems to confound the 
experts. Notwithstanding constant announcements that religion in educated 
Western Europe is "on the way out", many intelligent young people seem to 
have a keen desire to learn about traditional spiritual frameworks of human 
understanding. But frustration often ensues as the aspiring philosophy student 
climbs higher. The university study of philosophy in the anglophone world now 
offers little by way of a grand synoptic vision of human life and our place in the 
scheme of things. Instead, the subject has fragmented into a host of highly 
technical specialisms, whose practitioners increasingly model themselves on the 
methods of the natural sciences. By the time they reach graduate studies, most 
students will be resigned to working within intricate, introverted "research" 
programmes, whose wider significance they might be hard pressed to explain to 
anyone outside their special area.6
Cottingham's account of the arid climate of thought in anglophone philosophy, 
which induces him to conclude that philosophy urgently needs `to find a more 
humane voice,' lends weight to Nietzsche's complaint that modern philosophers have 
not done much to help the general public learn how to think with a good conscience. 
  
                                                     
6 John Cottingham, Philosophy as Confession, March, 2011, http://www.standpointmag.co.uk (my italics). 
The title of this article refers to Stanley Cavell's latest book.  
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Indeed, Cottingham can be read as alluding to the serious spiritual damage that can 
be done by attempts to suppress the `large' questions of traditional philosophy, such as 
`What is Good Thinking?' (which seems tightly bound up with, among others, `What 
is Good Living?'). For not only the intellectual health of students of philosophy is put 
into jeopardy when they are obliged, on pain of expulsion from what amounts to an 
elite club, to learn how to compete in esoteric competitions wherein the winners are 
those who can invent the most clever technical solutions to artificially constructed  
problems. It is as though the perennial problem of how to live well is of minor 
concern to serious thinkers. Just the opposite may be the case,  for any kind of 
teaching that promotes the teaching of narrow perspectives can be charged with 
helping to encase  souls in strait-jackets.7
Put another way, the situation in anglophone philosophy prompts one to wonder 
whether it mirrors the sad fact that the collective mentality of the anglophone world, 
which appears to be the  headquarters of an especially callous form of global 
capitalism, has rendered itself incapable of nurturing the sort of concerned soul that 
the idea of cultural physician elicits. The current econo-political climate as well as the 
intellectual climate indicates anyway how hard it will be for modern philosophers to 
develop a more humane conception of philosophy's social responsibilities. Nietzsche 
can therefore be praised at least for bringing into the open a burning question, 
although it is far from clear how to go on from where he left off. Indeed, a good many 
moderns may simply object that philosophy has no need for a radical cultural therapy 
since the West has already evolved an enlightened mode of thought. However, the 
celebrated scientific revolution of the 17th century does not unproblematically refer to 
a turning point in the history of thought---when the quest for good sense finally 
became modern and left behind the irrational superstitions of the premoderns. The 
contrary seems to be closer to the truth. Although the evolution of  thought in this 
culture may at one time have promised a triumphant reason capable of continually 
enhancing a dominion of good sense, it is now undeniable that the evolution of 
consciousness does not necessarily refer to a positive or `upward' climb towards a 
wiser and deeper sensibility. Indeed, it seems that at this celebrated historical juncture 
in the development of the collective mentality of the West, leading intellectual and 
political thinkers chose a fatally wrong turning, since the path they selected to follow 
has arguably led to a false conception of rationality which has made reason itself into 
  
                                                     
7 For an account of how philosophy has fared similarly in Australian universities, see the article  `I'm 
smart, therefore I am,' by Stephen Buckle, The Australian, August 06, 2008 
(http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/). I am grateful to Arran Gare for this reference and the 
preceding one in the above note.  
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a victim.8
Hence the common word `modern' ought to bring us to a complete halt in order 
to think long and hard about what this adjective signifies, for it appears to cover over 
a great many hypocrisies, if not convenient lies. As I have already noted, this is partly 
evidenced in the way in which the meanings of important ideas have come to be 
interpreted by modern self-styled `rationalists.' Putting into question what appears to 
be a culturally endorsed, systematic inversion of meanings, Bruno Latour argues that 
the moderns never really did become modern.
  
9
Thus if one grants that any attempt at rational thought must involve an aim to 
take into account all at once the intimate, intricate, and probably dynamic 
relationships (assuming we live in an evolutionary world) that closely tie these three 
resources together, it is surely high time for philosophy to adopt a truly modern, or 
nonmodern, mode of reasoning. The foregoing remarks indicate that this must 
involve attempts to do justice above all to Nature; or better, the hither side of nature-
culture, since there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as Nature pure and simple. As 
for what `doing justice' might mean, the anomalies elicited by the little word 
`modern,' not to mention the extreme vagueness of the idea of Nature, indicate that 
one might well begin all over again by reflecting on the puzzle of why and where 
things began to go askew in the evolution of thought in this culture.  
  That is, they never did honestly strive 
to do full justice all at once to the three overlapping domains of serious inquiry---
nature, culture, and discourse. For how can one speak justly about some aspect of 
nature without enlisting the culturally endorsed resources of some common means of 
expression; that is, those extant systems of symbolism that the culture happens to have 
privileged? Or again, how is it possible to defend the intelligibility and propriety, 
never mind the rationality, of one's symbolically expressed interpretations of selected 
events in Nature without at the same time presupposing one has at hand a just way to 
link these symbolisms to `truth' or `reality'?  
Consider, for instance, the highly influential Descartes, who famously described 
himself as a `thinking thing.' Since one of his chief concerns was to find a way to 
demonstrate that the secret of good reasoning lies in precise mathematical methods, 
he can be cited as a salutary example of how not to begin to think about good 
thinking. For he indirectly demonstrates that the truly modern philosopher must 
begin by acknowledging at once that a philosopher is only a linguistically competent 
                                                     
8 See Arran Gare,  'Reviving the Radical Enlightenment: Process Philosophy and the Struggle for 
Democracy' in Researching with Whitehead: System and Adventure, ed. Fanz Riffert and Hans-Joachim Sander 
(Frieburg/Munchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 2008). 
9 Bruno Latour (1991), We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
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`perplexed self' who happens to be inclined, if only at times, to wonder what might be 
the best way to order and arrange all the `things' that can be thought about. Such a 
project cannot help but identify a host of possibly relevant factors, if only to dismiss 
the bulk of them. These include not only a great variety of non-thinking `things' that 
provide the furniture of thought (such as ideas, images, symbols, and so on) but also 
the thoughts of other `thinking things.' Yet all that is clear is that thinking cannot take 
into account everything at once---which is not a mere truism since it brings the 
themes of interest and importance to the forefront of the quest to understand 
understanding.    
This convoluted situation indicates, in short, that the more seriously one pursues 
the `large' question that chiefly concerns Descartes, `What is a rational thinking Self?,' 
the more one is bound to watch this notion recede into a fog of vague word-symbols. 
So if one happens to be unfashionably inclined to insist on asking that ur-question of 
philosophy, `What is good thinking?,' it is necessary to take up at once its close 
companion:`What is good living?', as well as indeterminable number of other, 
intimately related but inevitably vague, `large' questions.  
No wonder so many professional philosophers are reluctant to entertain the really 
`large' ones, such as `What is Mind?' without  immediately turning for help to science. 
Yet there are few ideas that seem more elusive than mind, unless it is matter. No 
doubt this is why a good deal of energy has been spent  on finding ways to avoid 
facing up to this consideration. Much effort has been expended, for instance, on 
attempts to eliminate vagueness and ambiguity from serious discourse. Yet these 
alleged enemies of clear thinking are manifestly characteristics of all natural 
languages. They may even be of great philosophical significance inasmuch as once 
they are acknowledged as perfectly in order, they force into the open the question 
what role imagination actually plays in good thinking. 
In fact the ubiquity of vagueness seems fully in accord with the idea of evolution. 
It renders dubious, to say the least, the rationality of the quest for precise and 
complete solutions to specially selected problems. There appear to be no verbal 
expressions that do not need to deploy debatable assemblages of word-symbols whose 
meanings cannot be made either definite or fixed---except by fiat. This is hardly 
surprising if meanings can evolve along with everything else in a thoroughly 
evolutionary world. In any case, once it is agreed that it is senseless to attack those 
erstwhile presumed enemies of clear thinking, vagueness and ambiguity, why not just 
go on to acknowledge that `thinking things' are first and foremost embodied, warm-
blooded, creatures of Nature who happen to be inventive symbol-users and symbol-
makers?  
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Thus apart from recognizing that we live in a world shot through with created 
symbolisms of many kinds, the only clarity immediately available to a truly honest 
`thinking thing' appears to be that the activity of thinking is not unlike that of 
breathing and so is bound to share some of the mystery of life itself. Hence, once one 
alludes to the topic of Nature in a context of thinking hard about Life and Thought, 
one is perhaps face-to-face with a profound mystery.  
Be that as it may, we must surely admit that the `quicknesses' exhibited by all 
forms of life that bear witness to   some sort of capacity to think (and which forms of 
life do not?) indicate that a self-policing mentality is the last thing this culture needs. 
There appears to be little hope that justice can be done to Nature without 
acknowledging that Life and Thought are elements of Nature. That is to say, the 
word `Nature' can be viewed as a kind of shorthand for a constellation of salient 
characteristics among which certain vital activities stand out which bear witness to an 
inherent sentience in Nature. Thus the intrepid philosophical inquirer into the 
meaning of good thinking, or good sense, cannot avoid plunging immediately into the 
middle of a maelstrom of profound puzzles related to the genesis and function of the 
privileged symbolisms that pertain to the expression of those aspects of experiencing 
that are deemed relevant. But then does one not arrive at that most unignorable 
question of all philosophical questions: `What is Experience?'  
In other words, the above discussion points up the urgent need to recognize the 
truth of another of Frye's observations (on the first page of the first chapter of The 
Educated Imagination): `the simplest questions are not only the hardest to answer, but 
the most important to ask.' This elementary truth not only indicates the centrality of 
imagination in trying to frame the task of philosophy, it brings out the central 
importance of the frequently ignored themes of interest and importance, thus raising 
the especially poignant question of how best to begin to examine all the above-
mentioned themes in a context that might be able to do a little justice to the 
fundamental notion of experience.  
Thus whenever beginning students of philosophy are discouraged from asking 
`What is Life?', `What is Thought?',  `What is Morality?' and so on, they are not only 
being cheated of a proper philosophical education; that is, assuming this has 
everything to do with learning how to think. That their very souls may be being 
placed in jeopardy is indicated in so far as logicistic or analytic thinkers prevent them 
from even asking what role imagination actually plays in philosophical attempts to 
become clear about fundamental ideas. For there is no warrant whatsoever for 
banning `large' questions on the spurious ground that they encourage fanciful 
flirtations with vague ideas or anarchic `soft' reasonings. On the contrary it is just at 
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the point where the topic of imagination begins to rear its fearsome head that the 
really profound and difficult problems of philosophy arise. Their suppression thus 
compounds the suspicion that proponents of the ideal of rigour are infused with a 
neurotic fear of the powers inherent in the capacity to think. For what else could  
prompt self-consciously rational thinkers to retreat behind high protective walls that 
are continually being reinforced by the champions of scientific `progress'? Indeed, this 
mantra appears to draw most of its obfuscating power from what I have elsewhere 
called the Grand Myth of Scientific Superrationality---the acritical presumption that 
the best of human reasoning is that which models itself on scientific methods.10
3. ON TRYING TO IMAGINE A HEALTHY CULTURE  
  
I am suggesting that one of the biggest obstacles in the way of a radical reform in the 
perverted conception of reason endorsed by the allegedly enlightened West may be a 
toxic set of myths which precludes  recognizing that the topic of myth may itself be 
highly relevant to the quest to understand rationality. Such a view informs anyway 
Nietzsche's diagnosis of a sick collective mentality shot through with self-deception 
and dishonesty. For the core of his diagnosis of a sick culture is not that it has adopted 
a form of reasoning that has failed to free itself from all illusions. On the contrary, he 
holds that a healthy culture is one that is informed by `vital illusions.' He thus brings 
out into the open the consideration that in order to define a healthy culture it is 
necessary to confront the ghosts that live beneath the surface of the collective 
consciousness.  
Without doubt Nietzsche outlines a difficult task, since what moves and has its 
being in these lower depths can only be inferred from surface ripples, such as the 
`common sense' beliefs that guide thought in the culture. So with this in mind, it is 
worth reflecting on Frye's claim that every ideology bears witness to a hidden 
mythology, which is a thought-grounding set of usually unremarked, very general 
beliefs that reflect that society's chief concerns. But since such concerns are neither 
fixed nor easy to identify, he suggests a mythology might better be described as a 
`reservoir of possible beliefs.'11
More specifically, might one then say that those ideologies that happen to 
 Hence by thus alluding indirectly to processes of 
selection and valuation of mere possibilities whose realizations will ultimately 
determine the peculiar character of the culture, Frye also indicates that the topic of 
imagination is closely bound up with the problem of how to define a healthy culture.  
                                                     
10 A more detailed discussion can be found in my Myths of Reason: Vagueness, Rationality, and the Lure of Logic 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1995).  
11 The Modern Century, p. 115. 
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predominate in the collective consciousness of a given culture bear witness to products 
of an only more or less well-cultivated collective imagination? If an ideology can be 
conceived as an applied mythology, as Frye holds, and if regnant ideologies are the 
chief directors of the evolving (or devolving) character (or soul) of that culture, the 
cultural physician is facing here a perhaps unresolvable problem. It is hardly a simple 
matter anyway to decide where and how to begin a cultural therapy if this involves 
the need to imaginatively tap into a hidden reservoir of flexible (perhaps evolving) and 
only potentially life-enhancing beliefs. For even if perchance the overall effect of some 
form of cultural therapy turns out to be positive, one may still be left to wonder 
whether this is really the result of a new infusion of the sort of `vital illusions' which 
Nietzsche says no healthy culture can do without.  
A fruitful way forward is perhaps indicated in Frye's interpretation of the role of 
myths in processes of enculturation. His idea of good myths can be likened to 
Nietzsche's `vital illusions' inasmuch as both contribute, as Frye puts it,  to `life in 
more abundance.' To this end, he usefully distinguishes between primary and 
secondary myths which reflect parallel running concerns. Primary concerns are vital 
in the sense that they are directly related to the basic needs of all its members---such 
as sufficient food, adequate shelter, freedom of movement and of thought, and so on. 
Secondary concerns are more peripheral to the long-term health of a culture since 
they may absorb or dissipate both the energies and the will needed to satisfy primary 
concerns. The quality of any regnant mythology, in short, may be inferred from the 
sort of concerns that appear to inform dominant ideologies and hence the collective 
mentality of the culture. For as Frye sums up the matter, the mythology, good or bad,  
underwrites the ideology, good or bad.  
It does not appear hard to illustrate his point.  Consider the current state of the 
collective mentality of the USA. Having once escaped an imperialistic tyranny in 
order to stand proudly and independently as a beacon of hope for all those who 
dream of a liberated and enlightened society, the USA has since become hostage to a 
mutually reinforcing set of bad secondary myths. Upholding the rectitude of  crass 
materialistic values while at the same time preaching the superiority of Christian 
values, its leaders exemplify a shameless penchant for double-speak and hypocrisy. 
They have not so much learned a bad sense as how to give the impression of a deep 
respect for good sense (e.g., with frequent professions of a love for freedom, openness 
in political decision-making, respect for the rule of law, etc.). Ostensibly a democracy, 
it manifests a polity that is effectively controlled by an unelected corporatocracy. Its 
foreign relations are determined by a military-industrial complex that dreams of 
establishing a global hegemony over land, sea, air, and space, regardless of the cost. 
 MURRAY CODE 32 
While constantly advertizing itself as a lover of peace, it is a culture that allows itself to 
be swayed by constant assurances of the necessity of permanent war. This is 
continually reinforced by constant references to an obviously false myth---of 
exceptionalism---which is perpetuated by an uncritical media that sustains a general 
fear of the evil designs of phantom enemies who can be conveniently replaced 
overnight.  
The `American way of life,' in short, evokes the figure of a giant, half-blind super-
rogue state that has entrenched a great many secondary myths, which leads it to 
masquerade as a divinely appointed enemy of all rogue states. Mindlessly bent on 
global hegemony, its leaders manifest a lack of genuine concern for anything but the 
state's own material well-being, which is usually expressed in terms of `national 
interest.' Hence this one example indicates that the first question one needs to ask is 
not `What is to be done?' but rather `Can anything be done?' Perhaps there is a point 
of no return in the degeneration of a collective  mentality at which the very idea of 
recovery becomes otiose.  
We seem to have here, at any rate, a prime example of a culture hopelessly mired 
in a mythology of unconcern. On the other hand, all may not be lost if Nietzsche is 
right and philosophy is capable of assisting in the recovery of a sick culture through 
creating a philosophy of concern. For his line of thought is clearly and unequivocally 
on the side of Life. That is, he seems to suggest that it might be possible to instill in the 
collective mind-set a re-vitalizing mythology with the power to foster truly `vital 
illusions.' These would provide the germs of a new collective consciousness guided by 
healthier ideologies. 
I have however indicated that the more pressing question facing a would-be 
cultural physician is not just how but whether it is even possible to overcome the 
hegemony of a nihilistic mythology of unconcern. Or to put this crucial point another 
way, it is far from clear whether, never mind how, a re-vitalizing mythology of 
concern could emerge under the aegis of a far from humble reason which promotes 
and protects narrow perspectives that militate against the growth of a general 
will/desire for radical change. Perhaps the line of thought I am pursuing betrays an 
unreasonable and empirically unwarranted faith in an as-yet untapped,  potential 
human wisdom---one that the main currents of modern thought have done much to 
undermine.   
I have already alluded to the impoverished state of education in the West. But it is 
perhaps worth noting a few more of the unpropitious developments that have taken 
place in the some of the more prestigious institutions of higher learning. Apparently 
swayed by the Grand Myth, not to mention the sort of socio-economic myopia  
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perpetuated by the clever proponents of global capitalism, many of the best 
universities of the West may be accused of betraying their primary responsibility---
which is simply to educate; that is, to encourage learning of a kind that is not 
governed solely by practical calculations. Yet it seems that a good many universities 
have been taken over by efficiency-minded managers who make quantity rather than 
quality the primary measure of value, so that the task of judging the contributions of 
the faculty has become degraded to a weighing of dry abstractions. For the industrial 
ideals of efficiency, productivity, and profitability appear to have become the 
measures of  worth even in the humanities where academic achievement is frequently 
judged in terms of utility---that is, its  `impact' on society.12
So if the primary responsibility of a university is to assist any therapeutic project 
that might have a positive effect on the health of the enveloping culture, the extant 
institutions of higher education afford little reason for optimism. If their major 
concern ought to be how to go about strengthening any department of the humanities 
that can contribute to the cultivation of the imaginations of its students, it is no small 
thing that just the opposite appears to be taking place. For the humanities are now 
under constant attack by single-minded philistines whose limited visions may owe as 
much to a self-policing will as to deeply entrenched toxic myths that `legitimize' this 
will.  
   
Briefly, then, a reform movement whose aim was to engender a truly enlightened 
society informed by a vital mythology of concern may require at the very least that the 
bulk of energies and resources available to educators everywhere be switched to the 
humanities, at least for the time being. This eventuality does not seem very likely, 
however, for it is not only philosophy that controls the dominant conception of good 
thinking in the West. It seems that a much stronger support for a self-policing 
collective mentality is provided by the neo-Darwinian interpretation of evolution.  
4. ON THE INJUSTICE DONE TO THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION BY THE 
MODERNS 
Assuming that the notion of evolution refers to a well-evidenced `fact' of Nature 
(although not, I am suggesting, a well-understood one), it is first worth noting that 
evolution is an extremely vague notion. This should not be surprising, since it is 
essentially a metaphysical one. That is to say, it refers to an especially salient, very 
                                                     
12 This development invites, in short, a serious charge of treason inasmuch as academia has joined the 
company of self-serving politicians and corporate managers who are waging the modern `war on society.' 
See, e.g.,  Henry A. Giroux, “Militarized Conservatism and the End(s) of Higher Education,”   Truthout, 
April 5, 2011 (www.Truthout.org). 
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general, characteristic of Nature. So the next thing to note is that the Darwinian 
approach to evolution is, like many another modern scientific theory, overtly hostile to 
metaphysics even as it covertly appeals to the metaphysics of mechanistic materialism. 
Thus affording another example of the obfuscating power of the Grand Myth, it is no 
accident that the Darwinian theory of evolution also supplies the main support for a 
culture enamoured of a laissez-faire ideology that promotes the virtues of individualistic 
utilitarian values. This symbiotic relationship between highly influential 
representatives of  both science and society thus draws a great deal of support from an 
essentially nihilistic approach to the study of life and thought.   
Yet the only sure thing one can say about the idea of evolution is that it holds that 
new forms of both mental and physical organization can emerge from old forms. 
Hence the extreme vagueness of the idea of evolution carries over to the key idea of 
emergence. So nothing really precludes thinking that the ongoing emergence in 
Nature of an increasingly complex network of interacting organisms betokens a 
mysterious `directedness'---which does not necessarily evoke an omniscient `external' 
Grand Designer. For the bulk of the evidence for evolution only supports the claim 
that Nature is an ongoing process, or better, a process of  processes that do not 
necessarily move in an `upward' direction. Nonetheless, it is a Nature that is 
conceivably infused with a teleological dimension. 
In other words, the notion of emergence can be conceived in terms of  `inner' 
processes like those that inform the productions of an imaginative artist whose 
spontaneous decisions are made on the fly, as it were, yet give the impression of a 
certain `directedness' of creative intention. However, most artists do not claim to 
know exactly what they are trying to produce before they have actually produced it. 
The point is that the key Darwinian idea of  `the survival of the fittest' may refer only 
to the emergence of locally viable novel forms of organization that may be just as 
`unplanned' as many, if not all, works of art. For artists can be said to be inventing 
their problems even as they provide solutions for them. It is therefore not that hard to 
think that some of Nature's more ingenious `adaptations' to the challenges presented 
by constantly changing exigencies as creative solutions to the problems inevitably 
posed by a restlessly evolving world.  
One may thus suspect that neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, which trumpets 
the explanatory sufficiency of the two simple principles of Chance and Natural 
Selection, is primarily bent on avoiding at all costs the most profound question of  
natural philosophy---whether Nature is essentially sentient and self-creative, and if so 
to what end it might be striving. The orthodox theory may simply be perpetrating a 
gross injustice in the form of a perhaps invincible form of nihilism. For any 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 35 
naturalistic theory which ultimately appeals to a mechanistic metaphysics for support 
effectively robs existence of both meaning and value---since whatever is deemed to be 
composed of an essentially insentient and inert `stuff' does not really matter in any 
broad sense of the word.  
In any case, just to the extent that a re-thinking of the fundamental notion of 
evolution calls for a rethinking of the  fundamental metaphysical idea of matter, a 
would-be cultural physician is surely obliged to stop and think about the suitability or 
adequacy of the regnant metaphysics. For it is only on the planks of whatever is 
chosen to float a probably intrinsically unsteady boat that one may be able to do a 
little justice to those peculiarly human quickenings that characterize human life and 
thought. Especially when one comes to try to account for the existence of those 
ephemeral concerns that appear to distinguish human life from that of `lesser' 
animals. For what stands out in human experiencing are moral/ethical and/or 
aesthetic concerns---not to mention even more primitive feelings of importance or 
interest. As for the question of the significance of yearnings for justice, it is very hard 
to believe that these feelings have emerged in human beings from accidents that 
somehow contribute an adaptive advantage to this evolving organism. It seems far 
easier to believe that when one moves up the spectrum of orderly forms of existence---
from primitive organisms to the more sophisticated forms of human life---the more 
advanced become the relevant sensibilities the more they exhibit differences in kind in 
respect to vital capacities as well as differences in degree in respect to modes of 
physical organization. 
But since there is no possibility of proving (or disproving) such claims as the 
above, the only course of action open to the natural philosopher is to attempt to 
become clearer about the meaning of good thinking. So let us briefly consider those 
investigations of mind---or better minding, since we are speaking here of a dynamic 
activity, not a static entity---that are pursued by that large company of  allegedly 
rational scientists who believe it is possible to trace our wonderfully complicated 
streams of consciousness to purely physical events or functionings in material organs, 
or brains. It surely requires a good deal of faith in the ideology of scientism to believe 
that an examination of, for example, the pictures generated by various imaging 
devices (which   record traces of physical events in brains) can tell us much about 
those invisible signs of `quickness' that are usually referred to as `insights' or 
`intuitions.' Furthermore, if Nietzsche is right and a more just conception of 
rationality must recognize the existence of rational instincts, it is also necessary to take 
into account the possibility that instincts tout court refer to intertwined physical and 
mental entities which may be always evolving. That is, emergence perhaps ultimately 
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refers at bottom to self-guided if not planned realizations of novel possibilities which 
must be inherent in Nature---a situation that leads still further to tricky questions 
about what sort of creative agency(s) might be involved in such realizations. To cling 
to the orthodox Darwinian approach is, in short, merely to remain content with 
reductive `explanations' that simply dismiss a good deal of what makes life and 
thought interesting.  
So without needing to pursue the matter much further, one might begin to 
wonder at this point that the matter requires bringing in not only rational but 
aesthetic and moral/ethical instincts, not to mention an instinct for right judging. 
Indeed, the latter would seem to supervene over all the others. And what else but the 
word `instinct' could form the kernel of an adequate response to Nietzsche's central 
question of philosophy: `[W]here could a means of implanting the power of 
judgement be found?' Were it not for the tyrannical gate-keeper of Darwinism, it 
might generally be recognized that one of the more astounding facts of human 
existence is that Nature has evolved an organism with potentially creative-critical 
world-altering powers of minding that cry out for a nuanced story centered not on 
adaptation for the sake of survival but rather on every organism's capacity for judging 
its own peculiar situation rightly. And indeed with the help of marvellously astute, 
albeit fitful, insights, at least in the case of the human organism. For the undoubted 
complexity of human existence would surely have long since overwhelmed this 
complex animal were it not for its remarkable capacity to balance justly a shifting 
plurality of competing as well as cooperating concerns.  
In respect to learning how to live, then, it seems that each infant brings into the 
world a compendium of potential capacities which may contain the seeds of  future 
concerns, seeds that are fated to remain dormant in the absence of  proper cultivation. 
The most important of these seeds, I have suggested, are the latent powers of 
imagination that may well be indispensable for a proper cultivation of the powers of 
judgement. For this reason alone, the human animal surely deserves to be 
distinguished in kind from the so-called `lower' animals (since each type of animal life 
manifests its own peculiar concerns). In which case, it would be merely arbitrary to 
deny out of hand that the complexity of human life calls for a special philosophy of 
concern. The real difficulty in framing such a  philosophy may thus revolve about 
how to educate the `free spirits' whose chief philosophical goal would no longer be 
conceived in the terms of the traditional philosophical quest for pure, self-subsistent 
knowledge or truth---since it appears that the idea of `truth' ought now to be 
rethought so as to leave plenty of room for the intervention of the powers of 
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imagination and judgement.13
5. HOW MIGHT ONE THINK JUSTLY ABOUT NATURE? 
  
So let us make one further attempt to sketch a picture of Nature, one that depicts a 
great variety of sentient organisms immersed in a complex, dynamic flux of 
interacting concerns. Each organism that exhibits any sort of quickness can be 
conceived as forever in process of attempting to dynamically and justly balance all the 
various influences that stream into it and away from it in every direction, as it were. 
Thus the idea of Nature, far from eliciting a dead or insentient `something,' elicits the 
image of a living, breathing, vulnerable mortal being. It is in respect to such a cosmic 
image that one can speak intelligibly about the emergence of an intermittently just, 
frequently perverse, often fraudulently rational homo sapiens. Our dire situation, in 
other words, may simply represent the last act of a tragedy that seems bound to end in 
something more dreadful than tears, at least if those who either deny or ignore the 
warnings implicit in the notion of climate change, not to mention the avalanche of 
environmental degradations perpetrated by rational `man,' continue to uphold the 
nihilistic attitudes which both Nietzsche and history tell us are endemic to the thinking 
of the moderns.  
On the other hand, since the rough picture sketched above evokes an ongoing 
drama populated by more or less artful dancers who move and have their being in 
only more or less harmonious and justly balanced networks of interlocking concerns, 
hope is not futile. Whatever might promise a radical readjustment of `normal' modes 
of living and thinking can also encourage movements of genuine reform. For each 
dancer can be viewed as a sentient, independent individual who is free to exercise 
his/her own peculiar complement of latent powers. Thus while it may no longer be 
possible to speak unqualifiedly of a pre-determined order of nature, this idea is not 
entirely vacuous. But it may refer at bottom only to temporary reconciliations in 
processes of world-making that could be just as prone to going wrong as right.14
That is, evolution in this view is conceivably just as capable of regression as 
progression, so it might be helpful to pause and survey some of the more salient 
aspects of the nihilism (or regressive forces) in which we now find ourselves immersed. 
It is first worth noting that what stands out for Nietzsche is also that which strikes 
  
                                                     
13 ‘[T]ruth...has its roots in justice.' Untimely Meditations, p. 89. And so does reality, one can argue, since 
the notion of justice is elicited by the general problem of how to conceive the integration of the products 
of the operations of all the faculties involved in the actual processes of making sense. See Chapter 7 of my 
Process, Reality, and the Power of Symbols. 
14  For a more detailed discussion of this image of the cosmos, see my Process, Reality, and the Power of 
Symbols. 
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Arendt as especially significant, for he notes the haste with which `everyone [is] in 
flight from himself,' thereby suggesting that most of us fear nothing so much as having 
the `leisure to stop and think.'15
This problem being also one of Nietzsche's chief concerns, he can be understood 
as maintaining that to become more humane does not mean learning how to become 
more in tune with what other human beings take to be normal. More profoundly, he 
suggests that if the human animal is first viewed as part and parcel of a Nature which 
is always in process of becoming, the human being must also be viewed as in a 
continual state of becoming. That is to say, what motivates human becomings must be 
so conceived as to accord with the larger process of world-becoming. Which means 
that to become a humane human being is to become more than just the superior 
animal in a position of dominance over all other animals; it is to acknowledge that one 
must accept a certain specifically human responsibility in what Nietzsche calls a  
`project of becoming.'  
 But Nietzsche also lends support to Arendt's optimistic 
hint that thinking can  reasonably hope to be called good if it stops long enough to 
awaken the dormant moral and/or ethical instincts which every human being is borne 
with. She thus indicates that by reflecting hard and deeply enough on the provenance 
of instincts one might also learn how to develop more humane ways of thinking and 
living.  
The point is an invitation to ponder more deeply the implications of Nietzsche's 
belief that philosophy can help engender cultural physicians who can show the way to 
a better future. That is, it is essential to pause to ask what `better' could possibly 
mean. Why, one might ask, has Nature  gone to so much trouble to create all kinds of 
marvellous, embodied forms of sentience if not for the sake of some grand cosmic 
project which is reflected in the evolution of increasingly subtle forms of sensibility. 
Nietzsche in fact evokes a cosmic Will to Power that is responsible for at least 
spawning the vast array of different emboded little `wills to power' that manifest 
themselves in a great variety of quicknesses in the world. It  is thus not inconceivable 
that all forms of life and thought can be endowed with a certain cosmic significance 
inasmuch as no little will to power can be effective in making sense of its um-Welt 
unless its own world-making powers illustrate an instinctive need to develop its 
relevant potentialities.   
The situation, in short, underscores at the very least the need for an in-depth 
metaphysical account of what is actually going on in a world that is continually 
renewing itself while evolving ever more sophisticated forms of sentience. Such an 
                                                     
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Un. Press, 1997), p. 158. 
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inquiry must surely include a story about what it means to become human, a process 
that I am suggesting may reflect the above mentioned teleological dimension of the 
naturing of Nature. Indeed, Nietzsche when explicitly speaks of Nature's `redeeming 
project'---thereby suggesting a non-trivial reason for evolution---life is herewith 
decoupled from the simplistic modern line of thought that reduces the meaning of life 
to the mere preservation of life for its own sake. That is to say, Nature may have 
created in the human being much more than (to adapt King Lear) a materially  
unaccommodated `bare, forked creature' for it has also been endowed by Nature  
with a number of latent capacities or faculties that bear witness to a great variety of 
impractical concerns. Indeed, Nature is pressing towards a `final and supreme 
becoming-human,' Nietzsche suggests, in order to counter its coldness, cruelty, and 
indifference to Life. Perhaps he himself can be instanced as a prime example of a truly 
concerned human organism that has cultivated its latent faculties to the point of being 
able to engage effectively in a cosmic `project of redemption'---by taking up arms 
against nihilistic doctrines that in one way or another put into question not only the 
value of life but also the meaning of existence.16
Be this as it may, Nietzsche's reflections on the `man of redemption' bring out the 
need for a viable natural philosophy that might be able to do justice to the perennial 
and highly controversial question of the true nature of the relations that evidently 
obtain between minds and Nature. Or better mindings and nature-culture. For it may 
well be one of the more tragic aspects of the moderns' treatment of these fundamental 
relations that their elucidation has been handed over to self-styled naturalists who are 
the least disposed of modern philosophers to ask the ur-question, `What is Nature?' 
They prefer to either dismiss metaphysical speculations tout court as irrational, if not 
nonsense; or to make science itself into a metaphysics. But the moderns, I am 
claiming, have only succeeded in showing that scientists do not in general (with some 
notable exceptions) make good metaphysicians.  
  
So let us grant for the moment that there are good reasons to think metaphysics is 
as unavoidable as the need to accept the nonmodern epistemological dictum that no 
sharp boundary can be drawn between the material and the immaterial, the physical 
and the mental, the conscious and the unconscious, etc. Beginning thus in the 
intersection of the natural and the cultural, a  primary concern of the nonmodern (or 
truly modern) `naturalist' is how best to rethink all these fundamental themes without 
creating artificial divisions separating them. I have suggested that Nietzsche has 
contributed importantly to the project of the framing of thoroughgoing nonmodern 
naturalism. Others can of course be cited in this particular regard. A. N. Whitehead, 
                                                     
16 See  “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Untimely Meditations, pp. 157-79. 
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for instance, stands out as having constructed an essentially nonmodern, 
comprehensive  process-oriented metaphysics that depicts a self-creative Nature in 
which concern can be cited as playing a key if usually silent role.17 But Whitehead's 
current invisibility in main-stream philosophy also shows that it may be a long while 
before the moderns escape from the strictures of orthodox scientistic naturalists who 
have suppressed the necessity of metaphysical speculations on account of the allegedly 
superior rationality of systematic science. They therefore accord more importance to 
the dead structures of abstract thought than to the deliverances of actual or concrete 
experiencing, whereas it is the latter that we want to know most about.18
The trouble is that a full recovery from the modern choke-hold on how we think 
about life and thought would seem to require nothing less than the birth of a global 
will/desire for justice. For I am not saying that modern scientists have failed to 
provide natural philosophers with important knowledge of Nature. It is just that so 
many leading scientists are prone to adopt a self-serving, if not completely 
impoverished, concept of metaphysical reasoning. The irony is that they thereby do 
an injustice to their own notable achievements, for scientific expertise tout court bears 
witness to a special knack for conducting detailed investigations under certain 
specified conditions.
 
19
In other words, scientists can be likened to patient and conscientious detectives 
who assiduously search for clues (for they know not exactly what) within 
circumscribed crime scenes. This circumstance no doubt accounts in part for the 
understandable uncertainty of the laity in respect to many scientific pronouncements, 
for these can be as weird, far-fetched, and counter-intuitive as they tend to be 
confidently promulgated as highly rational. Hence perhaps an instinctive reluctance 
to take to heart the multifarious unproven implications of `climate change,' which 
affect not only what we take to be normal in living but also what we take to be 
common sense in thinking. Yet every claim for the `truth' or `reasonableness' of some 
scientifically established phenomenon must be grounded in some way---and what 
means could be more trustworthy than a careful balancing of an immense body of 
selected forms of evidence that have been slowly accumulated from many different 
  
                                                     
17 It is thus highly pertinent to this discussion that Whitehead refers to his `philosophy of organism' in 
some places as a `philosophy of concern,' a consideration that has in fact influenced much of the above 
discussion. 
18 The modern, semi-mystical preference for highly mathematized cosmological stories, such as the Big 
Bang theory, is a prime example of this tendency to privilege high abstractions; indeed, it seems the 
higher the better.  
19 Thus Darwin himself is justly praised for his detailed studies in biology which helped establish evolution 
as a virtual certainty.  
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areas of specialized inquiry?  
6. SO WHAT MIGHT A VITALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF CONCERN LOOK 
LIKE? 
All the above considerations point up one tentative answer to the question raised at 
the outset---whether the moderns are in a fit state to educate the sort of cultural 
physicians that Nietzsche calls for. His musings indicate that a viable, globally 
effective, philosophy of concern needs to be first grounded in a vitalistic metaphysics 
which must be essentially nonmodern. So hope for immediate improvement is 
inescapably fragile, if only  because of the tendency of the moderns to persist in 
misconstruing the meaning of metaphysics.  
     To surmount the tyrannical strictures of a self-policing collective mentality, I am 
claiming, nothing less than a complete overhaul of the mythological underpinnings of 
this benighted culture is needed. This may conceivably open up a space for the birth 
of a mythology of concern, for this is unlikely to spring spontaneously and phoenix-
like from the ashes of a self-immolating one. As Frye puts the point, `spontaneous 
generation is no more credible in culture than it is in biology.'20 On the other hand, if 
emergence cannot be understood without eliciting the unpredictable intervention of 
some sort of creative agency(s), this consideration may recede under a closer look at 
the damage done by the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution to the collective 
consciousness. Once this theory is finally deprived of its coercive powers, it is possible 
that a space will open up for free spirits to entertain a new and healthier mythology 
which may emerge just as `spontaneously' as any other aspect of an evolving nature-
culture. After all, if consciousness once gradually emerged from unconsciousness, and 
thus began its long and tortuous ascent to self-consciousness, it is not that hard to 
think that new, more just ways of reconciling the material and the immaterial sides 
thinking may even now be in process of emerging, if only here and there.21
But such a mythology is unlikely to take firm root unless a fertile ground has 
already been prepared for it. There are, in short, many reasons to think this is unlikely 
to happen overnight. Nietzsche provides a list of some of them; a list which is just as, if 
not even more, applicable to our own hard times:  
   
The sciences, pursued without any restraint and in a spirit of the blindest laissez-
faire, are shattering and dissolving all firmly held belief; the educated classes and 
                                                     
20The Modern Century, p. 26. 
21 There are in fact some hopeful signs of a positive development in the spontaneous rebellion that is 
usually referred to as the OWS movement, which has echoes in many other countries in the sense that all 
of them are notable not for any political demand but rather for a general concern for justice.  
 MURRAY CODE 42 
states are being swept along by a hugely contemptible money economy. The 
world has never been more worldly, never poorer in love and goodness. The 
educated classes are no longer lighthouses or refuges in the midst of this turmoil 
of secularization; they themselves grow daily more restless, thoughtless and 
loveless. Everything, contemporary art and science included, serves the coming 
barbarism. The cultured man has degenerated to the greatest enemy of culture, 
for he wants lyingly to deny the existence of the universal sickness and thus 
obstructs the physicians.22
But by lending support to all those who believe that it is possible to distinguish 
human animality from mere animality, Nietzsche not only indicates the falsity of the 
Darwinian dogma, that Nature is `red in tooth and claw.' He helps open up a space 
not only for rational but also moral, ethical, and aesthetic instincts. But it will be no 
simple task to shift dominant modes of thought onto this new plane of concerns. To 
this end, Nietzsche only proffers a few very important hints. He calls in particular for 
a renunciation of the `conceptual idolatry' that prevails throughout a good deal of 
modern philosophy. Here he perhaps puts his finger on what perhaps ought to be the 
primary epistemological concern of anyone who thinks that the modern tendency to 
believe that modern science is capable of doing justice to the quest to understand the 
roots of good thinking is simply wrong. For these roots may lie in a hidden region of 
awareness that can only be reached indirectly with the help of a suitable imagery.  
   
More specifically, when Nietzsche surveys the long history of the search for truth 
and wisdom in philosophy he sees only `[a] movable host of metaphors, metonymies, 
and anthropomorphisms.’ He thereby indicates that the most primordial acts of 
thinking take place not in the realm of the conceptual but rather in the realm of the 
imaginal. The implication for imaging the task of philosophy itself is thus immense, 
since the guarantor of a proper philosophical dialectic turns out to be not logic but 
rather a hidden capacity in human minding which is usually referred to as intuitive. 
Or should one say a more or less well-developed faculty of imagination  that may on 
occasion produce the insights that are the real rewards for stopping to think?  
One must in any event first abandon the reductive view that good reasoning in 
philosophy refers to rigorous and/or systematic method for achieving clear and 
definite understandings. There will never be found a means to establish a secure, 
systematic dialectic freed from debatable choices of word-symbols. The real difficulty 
in doing philosophy turns out to be how to choose an appropriate figurative language 
that might be able to do justice to human experiencing tout court. Such a language 
must be conducive, I have in effect been arguing, to a form of non-systematic 
                                                     
22 Ibid. pp.148-9. 
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reasoning capable of taking seriously some very large questions; such as `What is a 
Good Metaphysics?'---a question that, as Nietzsche indicates, includes, if it does not 
translate into, `What is a Good Metaphorics? The point is that not any sort of 
figurative language will do if the overall aim of philosophical reasoning is to achieve 
the greatest justice possible under current exigencies, for it is not as though philosophy 
has arrived at a point where it can abandon the notion of truth entirely.  
7. PHILOSOPHY AS CLOSE KIN TO POETRY 
The great difficulty in addressing that ur-question of philosophy, `What is a Good 
Metaphysics?' can perhaps be most clearly seen in the swarm of questions that hover 
about the problem of how to give a just account of  how sense is actually made. This 
consideration alone indicates that `experimentation' or `exploration' ought to be the 
watchwords of a truly modern (or nonmodern) philosophy. Acutely aware of this 
crucial consideration, Gilles Deleuze elicits an image of the philosopher as an intrepid 
explorer in a vast domain which might be called the `problematic of sense.'23 Since 
ever trickier questions keep springing out of the ground at the very feet of the 
explorer---like rhizomes, to use one of his favorite metaphors---he/she cannot even be 
sure how best to enter what might be called (to borrow from Latour) the  `Middle 
Kingdom' of problems and questions.24
But since controversy is bound to forever haunt philosophical discourse, it is not 
too surprising that Deleuze describes a philosopher as a kind of guerilla fighter who is 
always at war---especially with himself. For even the most cautious thinker is prone to 
err not only on account of being susceptible to what he calls the three common 
`misadventures of thought'---the `terrible Trinity' of madness, malevolence, and 
stupidity. Nor can the most conscientious thinker confidently claim to be possessed of 
a pure good will and an upright thought.  
  
All told, then, Deleuze  indicates that good reasoning requires a certain artfulness-
--which involves acquiring a certain expertise in identifying problems and framing 
questions. He thus points up the centrality of the problem of learning in philosophy. 
In his view, an apprentice philosopher is obliged to engage at once with the problem 
of learning how to learn, which is hardly a simple matter since according to him good 
learning takes place in the unconscious. If this is true (and every new-born infant 
                                                     
23 Gilles Deleuze (1968), Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994). `[T]he use of the word `problematic' as a substantive seems to us an indispensable neologism' (p. 
323).  
24 The `field of nonmodern worlds is the Middle Kingdom, as vast as China and as little known.' We Have 
Never Been Modern,  p. 48. 
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bears witness to its universality) he herewith brings to the forefront of the concerns of 
nonmodern philosophy the question whether or not any given approach is actually 
conducive to good learning. That this is not the case with a good deal of modern 
philosophy follows if it has indeed propagated, as Deleuze holds, a `dogmatic image of 
thought' that effectively `crushes'  the essence of thought---which is freedom of 
movement. This dogmatic image accounts in his view for the modern tendency to 
confine serious thinking to the static `world of representation'---where the creative 
powers of minding are stifled by what amounts to an anti-rational orthodoxy.  
Hence if Nietzsche is right and the truly `free spirits' of philosophy are those who 
have learned how to move freely in the realm of the imaginal, to the extent that 
modern philosophers have submitted to the dogmatic image of thought they actually 
promote anti-philosophy. The plain and simple truth is that any problem that is 
deemed of interest and/or importance cannot decide upon its own worth. Since this 
includes the problem of how best to image the task of philosophy itself, there is 
nothing to prevent anyone  from pursuing Nietzsche's view that philosophy is mainly 
concerned with a `movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms.’ Indeed, Deleuze bears this out since he shows in effect that the 
task of philosophy cannot even be described without enlisting some appropriate trope.  
At the moment, however, it must suffice to note that, if only on account of the vast 
extent of the problematic of sense, there is no way to settle this matter conclusively. So 
let us just presuppose that philosophy is both doable and worth doing. Furthermore, 
to assume that it exemplifies `a movable feast' of  imaginative insights, perspicacious 
images, and astute intuitions is to assume that at least some of them   have the 
capacity to enliven our understandings. But how could such re-vitalizing movements 
of thought occur, let alone retain a foothold in thought, without some reliable means 
of confirmation? And what else could these be if not (as in the domain of art) feelings 
of rightness? The trouble is that to acknowledge this much is to find oneself facing the 
question of how to include such ephemera in a viable metaphysics of concern. There 
seems, in short, no possibility whatever of delimiting the boundaries of philosophical 
inquiry. If this is so, philosophy needs to be viewed as close kin to any other literary 
endeavor which involves delicate and crucial decisions in respect to the suitability of 
the imagery or figurative language that is chosen for illuminating the matter at hand.  
To do philosophy, in other words, is to engage in the production of a literary form 
that bears a close affinity to the freely imagined but affectively controlled creations of 
fictional or poetic writers. It is thus highly significant that, as Frye observes, all literary 
forms are constructs of the imagination. The importance of this consideration for 
understanding philosophy's role in the making of  culture is that literary creations `tell 
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us things about human life that we don't get in any other way.'25
In sum, then, if good philosophy presupposes a good metaphysics (or better, 
metaphorics), the choice of an appropriate figurative language is crucial since it is 
what  ultimately provides for consistency and coherence. The upshot is that if a 
philosopher is really serious about acquiring a better understanding of understanding 
itself, he/she cannot help but invest a certain faith in the cognitive powers of word-
symbols. Such a faith does not in fact pose a problem for avid readers of `great' books 
who are not seeking merely for entertainment. Nietzsche can thus be read as advising 
the apprentice philosopher to begin his/her studies in the world of art. Indeed, here 
one can perhaps best see how the philosopher's yearning for truth (or better justice) is 
close kin to the artist-poet's hope to find just the right sort of expressions of 
`togetherness' that a good imagery shows it can provide when it induces the 
impression of connecting the hitherto unconnected.  
 So it must be with 
good philosophy, even if it is obliged to remain prosaically discursive in its actual 
presentations. Thus there is not such a great distance between philosophy and poetry 
as logically rigourous reasoners would like us to think. While poets are free to write in 
any way that they feel can do justice to whatever has commanded their immediate 
attention, philosophers are more constrained in their quest for justice. Nonetheless, if 
philosophy is but one among many literary forms, and if every literary form is, as Frye 
holds, `descended from and related to other literary forms,' the persistent positivistic 
dream of divorcing philosophy completely from poetry is an anti-philosophical 
delusion.  
It follows that another of Deleuze's proposed images for the task of philosophy is 
especially apt. He likens the history of philosophy to a kind of collage in painting. This 
implies that the doing of philosophy is like trying to contribute something of artistic 
value to a vast collage of ideas and images---whose provenance does not lie solely in 
the writings of  other philosophers. Or to borrow Nietzsche's language, philosophy tout 
court bespeaks an adventurous willingness to sample widely from a movable feast---
comprised of images, insights, and intuitions. Which involves keeping in mind of 
course that some apparently enticing tidbits can be poisonous. The upshot is that a 
good philosophical education, as Nietzsche confirms, can only be one that is able to 
balance a thinker's creative-critical powers which are always in need of further 
development.  
But since the sweep of great art, and especially great literature, is immense, the 
philosopher in search of good sense can only decide in the end on the value of the 
treasures he/she might find in the Middle Kingdom using an artful (i.e., 
                                                     
25 Northrop Frye, The Educated Imagination (Concord, Ont.: House of Anansi Press, 1993), p. 53. 
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creative/critical) dialectic. Here the final test of `truth' must be `whatever quickens 
the heart.'26 Which is hardly surprising if philosophy can only ever be a temporary 
and provisional, ideally just and health producing, mythopoeic form of story-telling.27 
So although venturing into the Middle Kingdom with the aim of bringing back 
treasures is far from being a pastime for idle  intellectuals, it is as risky a business as it 
is adventurous. Hence the would-be philosopher-therapist can only hope to assist in 
the engendering of a collective will/desire to stave off collapse into mob rule. For in 
the end there is nothing anyone can do, as Frye observes, except `to try to educate a 
minority that will stand out against it.'28
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26 The phrase is borrowed from a response of Chris Marker's to the question of what guided his editing of 
the vast quantity of film he exposed in making his documentaries.  
27 As Frye puts it, a mythology `forms a body of major premises which is superior in authority to 
scholarship and art.'  See The Modern Century, p. 117.   
28The Educated Imagination, p. 55. 
